Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by Bowman, G. Walter
Denver Law Review 
Volume 21 Issue 11 Article 4 
July 2021 
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
G. Walter Bowman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
G. Walter Bowman, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 Dicta 273 (1944). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
DICTA 273
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Proceduret
By G. WALTER BOWMAN*
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been in effect since
September 16, 1938, and during this six-year period we have become
familiar with them and can say that they are a tremendous success,
and their success is a fine tribute to judges of the federal courts and to
the federal bar; their worth has been recognized and has served as a
model for state procedure, and many states, including Colorado, have
adopted Rules of Civil Procedure, in place of outmoded procedures.
The aim of the Federal Rules is announced in Rule I. "They
shall be construed to secure just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action."
The underlying thought of the drafters of these rules was that
they be simple and easily understood; however, during the time that
has elapsed, we find that lawyers were not accustomed to rules that
were simple and easily understood, and that they renewed their study
of the law, and as a result the federal judges have handed down numerous
decisions on the rules.
Our experience with the rules now shows that they need some
clarification, and certain amendments are necessary to this end.
The Advisory Committe has prepared a preliminary draft of
proposed amendments to the Rules, which has been distributed to the
bench and bar with a request for criticism and suggestions to be placed
in their hands before December 15, 1944.
Rule 6 (b) Time.
Rule 6 (b) is a rule of general application giving wide discretion
to the Court to enlarge time limits or revive them after they have expired.
the only exception stated in the rule being a prohibition against en-
larging the time specified in Rule 59, that is to make motions for new
trial within ten days, and one against enlarging the time fixed by statute
for taking an appeal, that is three months.'
It should also be noted that Rule 6 (b), itself, contains no limi-
tation of time within which the court may exercise its discretion, and
since the expiration of the term does not end its power, there is now no
time limit on the exercise of its discretion under this rule.' Some other
tAn address before Colorado Bar Association, October 13, 1944.
*Of the Denver Bar, Clerk of the U. S. District Court, Colorado.
'Section 230 Title 28 USC.
'Page 4 of Preliminary Draft of proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Proce-
dure for the District Courts of the U. S.
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rules which contain time limits which may be set aside under this rule
are:
Rules 25, 50(b) and (d), and 60 (b).'
There is also Rule 73 (g), which makes provision for the court
to extend the time for filing and docketing the record on appeal, if the
order of extension is made before the expiration of forty days. One
court in construing Rule 6 (b) held upon a motion made after the
expiration of the forty-day period, that it could permit the docketing
on a showing of excusable neglect, and the contrary has been held in
other courts.' Alternative 2.
This alternative would deny to the courts the right to enlarge
the time, except to the extent specifically stated in Rules 25, 60 (b) and
73 (g). It would remove the present prohibition against extending the
time limits specified in subdivision (b) and (d) of Rule 59, that is to
make motions for new trials, and allow such motions, as well as those
under 50 (b), that is for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and
under 52 (b) that is for the amendment of findings and modification
or vacation of an existing judgment, to be made at any time without
time limit. The argument for this alternative is that the courts should
have the widest discretion, on a proper showing, at any time to relieve
a party from an unjust judgment, and that such relief is more impor-
tant than fixing a definite time for ending the litigation and producing
finality of judgments. Alternative 3.
This goes further than alternative 2, and would prevent the court
from enlarging the time except to the extent and under the conditions
stated in Rules 25, 50 (b), 52 (b), 59 (b) and (d), 60 (b) and
73 (g).
The main problem here is one directly affecting the finality of
judgments,' and the proposition that where there is a specific rule and
a general rule, which should govern? This can be determined by the
adoption of either of Alternatives 2 or 3, the one adopted depending
an the extent to which you desire to limit the scope of Rule 6 (b).
Rule 12, Pleadings.
There are three alernatives presented for consideration.
Alternative 1.
(a) First some minor changes are made and all references to
bill of particulars is deleted, and a new sentence has been added, "The
time for a party to plead or otherwise move under this rule may be
'Page 5 of Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments.
'Mutual Benefit Health &i Accident Ass'n vs Snyder, (6 C. A. 6th, 1940) 109;
Fed (2nd) 469, and in Burke vs Canfield- (App. D. C. 1940), 111 Fed (2nd) 526.
'Pre. Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civ. Pro. page 8.7Pre. Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civ. Pro. Page 3.
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extended by a written stipulation of the parties without approval of
the court." This sentence was added to avoid the results of a decision
of the Court,' wherein it was held that the parties may not extend the
time for answer, or for the performance of other acts under the rules,
by a stipulation unapproved by the Court. Such a stipulation is not
binding on the court or the parties; the only extension of time is found
in Rule 6 (b).
(b) adds the defense "(7), failure to join an indispensable
party" cures an omisison in the rules, which were heretofore silent as
to the mode of raising such failure.'
e. Again in this subdivision all reference to bill of particulars
has been eliminated, and there has been added the phrase, "where the
pleading is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot frame an
answer or a responsive pleading thereto." The motion provided for is
confined to one or more definite statements, to be obtained only in
extreme cases where the movant cannot frame an answer or a reply to
the pleadings in question. With respect to preparation for trial, the
party is properly relegated to the various methods of examination and
discovery provided in the rules for that purpose."
Rule 12 (e) as originally drawn has been the subject of more
judicial ruling than any other part of the rules, and has been much
criticized by commentators, judges, and members of the bar.
It is clear that the framers of the rules did not intend that the
compliance with Rule 8 that the pleadings be short and plain, would
subject a plaintiff to a motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 12 (e),
therefore the bench, bar and commentators have recommended the abso-
lute abolishment of Rule 12 (e) to simplify procedure and to facilitate
the determination of litigation.1
Perhaps the advisory committee felt that lawyers were so accus-
tomed to getting further information by bill of particulars that they
thought the modification as suggested would remedy the situation better
than the complete abolishment of the rule. I believe it is a step in the
right direction, and not so drastic as abolishment thereof.
(h) adds the phrase, "except (2) that the defense of failure
to prove a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to prove
a legal defense to a claim may also be made at the trial on the merits."
'Orange Theatre Corp. vs Rayherstz Amusement Co. (CCA 3d 1942 130, Fed
(2nd) 185.
'Pre-Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules-Page 15. See Commentary-
Manner of Raising Objections of Non-joinder of Indispensable Party (1940) 2nd Fed.
Rules Serv. 658 and (1942) 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 820. In one case-United States vs.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (E. D. Pa. 1941) 36 F Supp. 399,-the failure to
join an indispensable party was raised under Rule 12 (c).
"0Pre. Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules-page 16.
'Pre. Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules-page 16.
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The revision of subdivision (h) is in line with the changes made
in subdivision (g) and the language of the rule has been revised to indi-
cate its intent more clearly. By the amendment all available defenses
and objections to pleadings not properly presented are waived, with the
exception of matters expressly enumerated. The defenses stated in
clause (2) go to the very heart of the action and its succesful prosecu-
tion, and thus may be raised at the trial. The addition in clause (3)
of the phrase relating to indispensable parties is one of necessity."
Alternative 2.
This alternative provides for the disposition of certain motions as
a motion for a summary judgment and to be disposed of as provided
in Rule 56. Since we still have Rule 56, I believe that this alternative
should be rejected since it would tend to confuse the pleader as to which
rule would apply and the best that can be said for this alternative is that
perhaps it would save the filing of a second motion.
Alternative 3.
Accomplishes much the same result as Alternative 2.) :'
Rule 56 (c)
The amendment of Rule 56 (c) resolves a doubt as to the exact
meaning of the deleted phrase "except as to the amount of damages,"
by adding the sentence, "A summary judgment may be given on the
issue of liability alone as distinguished from the amount of damages."
It is intended to make it clear that the right to summary recovery may
be determined by preliminary order and the precise amount of the recov-
ery or damages be left for trial."
To Rule 56 an alternative rule has been proposed to be considered
with alternative 3 of Rule 12 in the event that the same is adopted.
Rule 71 A
Rule 71 A. is a new rule inserted with regard to the procedure in
the condemnation of property, for public use. This is an attempt to
harmonize the procedure which has varied in the many states. C. V.
Marmaduke, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney for the District of
Colorado, who has handled the greater portion of the condemnations
in this District, suggests among other changes the following:
Line 47, to and including line 53, Page 81, Rule 71-A provides:
"* * * The defendants shall appear and defend, and that in case
of failure to do so, judgment by default will be entered and that
thereafter they cannot raise any question of the plaintiff's right to
condemn or as to the value of the property and can be heard
only as to their rights to share in the distribution of the
award. * * *"
'Pre. Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules-Page 17.
"Pre. Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules-Page 19.
143 Moore's Federal Practice-page 3186. Pre. Draft of Proposed Amendments to
Rules-page 67.
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The Government is not at that point in the case prepared to
introduce evidence of value and the defendant would probably not be
so prepared.
The Colorado statute provides that just compensation shall be
determined by a jury or by commissioners. A jury cannot be empaneled
or commissioners appointed at this point in the procedure. The effect
would be to deny property owners the right to introduce testimony at
a hearing thereafter held and the only testimony that could be received
would be the government's evidence of value. I doubt if such part of
the rule would be constitutional, as it requires the defendant's day in
court to be at the time when the Colorado procedure does not provide
for hearing on value.
Line 92 to 95, Page 82, of the same rule provides: " * * * Copies
of the notice shall also be posted in a conspicuous place on each lot,
parcel or tract of the 'unknown owners' * * * "
Unknown owners should apply to persons interested in tracts
the record title of which is ascertainable. In many instances, the prop-
erty has been subdivided but there is no actual construction of roads,
alleys, streets, and no monuments within the area. Therefore, it would
be impossible to post o notice on a particular lot or tract with any
degree of accuracy. Also, never in any condemnation suit filed in
Colorado has there been a lot or tract owned by an unknown owner.
Abstracts always show the name of the owner. In one case which in-
volved 212 acres there were approximately 800 different owners, which
would have required notices being posted on 800 different lots, not
one of which lots could have been located without a survey.
Rule 73.
Which presents two alternatives. To Rule 73 (a) has been added
the following sentence, "After notice of appeal has been filed but before
the appeal has been docketed as provided in Rule 73 (g), the District
Court may dismiss an appeal on stipulation of the parties or upon
motion of the appellant."
By this amendment the district court is given express power to
dismiss an appeal on stipulation or upon the motion of the appellant
after the notice of appeal has been filed but before the appeal is docketed
in the circuit court. This makes it possible to avoid the useless formality
and expense of docketing the appeal and then dismissing it in the appel-
late court, as when the parties have agreed to a settlement and wish to
protect their rights."
"1Pre. Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules-Page 95. Heretofore, the gen-
eral view has been that once notice of appeal is filed the district court has no authority
to proceed further in the matter, except in aid of the appal or under Rule 60 (a) until
it has received the mandate of the appellate court. Miller vs. U.S.- 14 Fed. (2nd) 267:
Fiske vs. Wallace 115 Fed. (2nd) 1003 cert. den. 314 U.S. 663; Schram vs. Saftey
Inv. Co. 45 F. Supp. 636. In re Chinn Ben Shin-4 Fed. Rules Serv. 73 a 42:
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Alternative 2.
Alternative 2 adds in addition to the sentence above mentioned in
the first alternative a second paragraph, "An appeal to a circuit court of
appeals shall be taken within thirty days after written notice by a party
to the aggrieved party of the entry of the judgment complained of, proof
of which notice shall be filed within five days after service or, if such
notice be not served and filed, then forty days from such entry."
This would reduce the time for filing notice of appeal from the
statutory period of three months"6 to thirty days if notice is given, or
to forty days if notice is not given. It is an attempt to unify the civil
rule on appeal with Section 25 a of the Bankruptcy Act, by the adop-
tion of Section 25 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, by the adoption of
Section 25 (a) as a part of the civil rules. The general order in
bankruptcy'7 provides that appeals in bankruptcy matters shall be regu-
lated by the rules governing appeals in civil actions, including the rules of
civil procedure. Since the method of appeal in bankruptcy matters
needs no clarification, I do not believe that this should become the
basis of reducing the time for appeal in civil cases. It is apparent that the
time for appeal should be shorter in bankruptcy matters in view of the
fact that it is in the nature of a second appeal, it having been previously
heard by the court on a record and petition for review from the referee
in bankruptcy.
Rule 75-Record on Appeal to a Circuit Court of Appeals
(a) This subdivision is amended by the insertion of, "unless
the appellee has already served and filed a designation," and the insertion
of, "If the appellee files the original designation, the parties shall pro-
ceed under subdivisions (b) and (d) of this rule as if the appellee
were the appellant," giving the appellee the right to take the initiative
in filing the designation of matters to be included in the record for trans-
mission to the appellate court, where an appellant is slow or fails to
act promptly."
(b) and (g). The changes in the subdivision are designed to
eliminate the necessity for a second copy of the transcript, which is a
saving in the expense of perfecting an appeal.
(d) The addition of the phrase, "No assignment of errors need
by incorporated in the record on appeal * *" only emphasizes the fact
that assignment of errors are not to be required or included in the
record on appeal, and it also eliminates any necessity for cross-assign-
ments of error.
'"Sec. 230 Title 28 U.S.C.
"General Order in Bankruptcy No. 36.
"Pre. Draft of Proposed Amendments to Civil Rules-Page 103.
"6Pre. Draft of Proposed Amendments to Civil Rules-Page 103.
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Rule 77-District Courts and Clerks
(d) Amendment proposed is, "The time to appeal shall start
from the entry of a judgment, and for this purpose all parties are
charged with knowledge or the entry. Notification of the entry of an
order or judgment shall be given immediately by the clerk by mail in
the manner provided for in Rule 5 upon every party affected by the
order or judgment who is not in default for failure to appear, and he
should make a note in the docket of the mailing."
At the end of this sentence I would suggest the addition of the
phrase, "except when said judgment is entered on the stipulation of the
parties, then notice shall not be given."
The reason for my suggested amendment is obvious, since the rule
makes no exception, the clerk would have to send the notice, although
the order was entered on stipulation with all parties present.
The amendment proposed by the Advisory Committee makes it
clear that for the purpose of appeal it is incumbent upon all parties to
inform themselves of the entry of a judgment. Thus notification by the
clerk is merely for the convenience of litigants, and lack of notification
has no operative effect upon the time for appeal, nor does it authorize
the court to relieve a party from the consequences of a lack of knowledge
of the entry.' This amendment avoids such situations as the one aris-
ing in Hill vs. Haws (1944) 320 U.S. 520.
Rule 81.
To Rule 81 (a) 2, I would suggest the addition of a phrase,
"including proceedings under the Food and Drugs Act. '
This would clarify this rule, since Rule 81 (a) 1 specifically pro-
vides, "These rules do not apply to proceedings in admiralty." Pro-
ceedings under the Food and Drugs Act are brought under admiralty
practice, and are forfeitures of property for violation of a statute of the
United States, and thereby are construed to come under the provisions
of subdivision 2 of said Rule 81, which provides, "In the following
proceedings appeals are governed by these rules, * * * and forfeiture of
property for violation of a statute of the United States."
It has been held that food and drugs condemnation proceedings
partake of both admiralty and law; the seizure is made under admiralty
procedure, and is thereafter so conducted, unless an answer to the bill
is filed, in which case the Federal Rules will apply' while in an admiralty
case the court held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
'Pre. Draft of Proposed Amendments to Civil Rules-Page 108.
'Title 21 U.S.C.-Food and Drugs Act.
'1943 Supp. of Moore's Federal Practice page 3427. In United States vs. 23
Bottles, etc. (D.Ore.) 3 D. J. Bull 18, 1 Fed. Rules Serv. 81 a 11, Case No. 1. See
also Coffey vs. U.S. (1886) 117 U. S. 233; 443 Cans of Frozen Egg Products vs.
U.S. 1912, 226 U.S. 172.
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apply in admiralty, appellate jurisdiction in admiralty depends upon
substantial compliance with general appeal statute.'
In conclusion it is my recommendation that a committee be ap-
pointed to study the proposed amendments to the Civil Rules, and that
their recommendations be given to the Advisory Committee, with a
resolution of approval of the Colorado Bar Association.
'Compania vs. Georgia Hardwood Lumber Co., (C.C.A. 5, 1944) 141 Fed.
(2nd) 652 reversing F. Supp. 402.
